In a 14 page opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the District Court in the matter MBI Group, Inc. v. Credit Foncier Du Cameroun , docket number 09-7079, on August 6, 2010. An American plaintiff sued the government of Cameroon and parties from Cameroon in a contract and bribery matter.

The lower court had found the nexus to Cameroon to be very strong and the public interest nexus to the United States to be outweighed by the public interest of a trial in Cameroon that it had dismissed the matter under the forum non conveniens doctrine.

Instead of pursuing litigation in Cameroon as instructed by the District Court, the plaintiffs undertook minimal efforts abroad and soon petitioned the U.S. court to resume its proceedings because filing suit in Cameroon would be too expensive and a fair trial would be elusive.

On further instruction, the parties returned to the Cameroonian judiciary and defendants managed to arrange for hearings which could potentially reduce the burdensome filing fees for the plaintiffs. The latter refused to pursue such remedies, however, and turned once more to the District Court which again found against plaintiffs.

The Circuit Court upheld the forum non conveniens analysis of the lower court in all respects. There is not absolute right of an American plaintiff company doing business abroad to have its case heard in a United States court, the court explained. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On August 3, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City ruled in favor of EM Ltd. and NML Capital Ltd. in confirming ex parte orders dated May 22, 2007. The orders restrain and attach certain assets of the Republic in a trust administered by the U.S. Bank Trust National Association and deny BNA's motion to vacate these orders. The case is EM Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, docket number 09-3908. -- Sara Harr, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

Post removed at reader's request. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP.

On July 27, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City ruled in favor of Germany in confirming the dismissal of claims for old East German debentures by adding as a basis for dismissal the lack of allegations of commercial activities by state actors. The case is Mortimer Off Shore Services Ltd. v. The Federal Republic of Germany, docket number 08-1783. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On July 22, 2010, the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo. The 123-page decision is published on the court's website. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

Actual notice is insufficient in the service of process on Brazil, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia explained on July 10, 2010. In the matter Ibiza Business Ltd. et al. v. United States of America et al., docket number 10-296, the plaintiff had sought entry of a default judgment against Brazil but the court advised it to serve in strict compliance with 28 USC §1608(a)(3). -- Clemens Kochinke,, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washingcton, DC.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York City followed the Supreme Court and, on June 28, 2010, affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded the lower court's decision in Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, docket number 09-3743, with an eight-page opinion which begin as follows:

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern Districtof New York (Joanna Seybert, Judge) dismissing plaintiff's claims against the Republic of Chile, various government officials of Chile, and British Airways. Because the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Samantar v. Yousuf, --- S. Ct. ---, No. 08-1555, 2010 WL 2160785 (S. Ct. June 1, 2010) abrogated our prior holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act extends to officials of a foreign government acting in their official capacities, we vacate the judgment of the District Court insofar as it dismissed plaintiff's claims against the government officials of Chile.

The ruling helps in clarifying the limits of immunity under the FSIA for government officials. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On June 18, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered final judgment in the matter of Elisa Nili Cirilo Peres Ben-Rafael, et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., docket number 08-0716. This case is based on the default judgment in favor of the estate of David Ben-Rafael, a victim of a 1992 terrorist bombing at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Less than one month before the court entered default judgment in the original case, the National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008 28 USC §1605A was signed into law by then-President Bush, replacing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's original state-sponsor-of-terrorism exception. The act allows for awards of punitive damages and attempts to make it easier to collect FSIA judgments by entitling plaintiffs to impose liens on property belonging to state sponsors of terrorism.

The change prompted the plaintiffs to petition for the reissuing of the default judgment from Ben-Rafael I as to defendant Iran using the new jurisdictional grant in §1605A and for the court to declare a new defendant, the International Risk Governance Council, subject to the attachment provisions of §§1605A(g) and 1608(g) as an agency or instrumentality or Iran.

This court noted that it has jurisdiction over this case because service was proper and defendants' conduct falls within the state sponsor of terrorism exception in §1605A. Its jurisdiction to hear the case as a related action to Ben-Rafael I is based on the 2008 NDAA grandfathering related actions to timely commenced prior actions under §1605A's jurisdictional grant.

The court noted its ruling that plaintiffs here established their claims by evidence satisfactory to the court and reentered default judgment as to defendant Iran. The plaintiffs did not meet the burden showing that IRGC is an agency or instrumentality of Iran as required by 28 USC §1603(b). The court agrees that under the core commercial function test the IRGC is a government entity, not a separate legal person. Therefore, the court did not need to reach the second or third elements of the agency or instrumentality analysis.

The court decided that there is no reason for delay in directing the entry of final judgment and this conclusion is supported by the fact that in the past the identical judgment was issued and was itself a final judgment. The court entered judgment for plaintiffs in the amounts specified in Ben-Rafael I, 540 F. Supp. 2d 59 (2008) and directs entry of that judgment as final pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. -- Melanie Hardcastle, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, D.C.

On June 18, 2010, in Guevara v. Peru, docket No. 08-17213, a case that one of the Judges claims reads like the latest spy thriller, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case with the instruction that the case be dismissed without prejudice.

The claim was brought over Peru's refusal to pay an award to the plaintiff, Jose Guevara, after he successfully led to the capture of Vladmiro Lenin Montesinos Torres. Montesinos was at one time the head of Peru's National Intelligence Agency. During his time as director of the intelligence agency, he allegedly committed a large number of serious crimes including arms trafficking, drug dealing, money laundering, and more than a few murders, id at page 3. After being exposed through a series of videotapes that were leaked to the media, Montesinos fled the country. Peru publically posted an emergency decree which established a financial reward of $5 million dollars for any information leading to his capture.

Montesinos fled to Caracas and was hidden by Jose Guevara who nursed him back to health after he had facial reconstructive surgery meant to hide his identity. Guevara was also handling Montesinos' communications with Pacific Industrial Bank in Miami, Florida. Montesinos requested, through Guevara, that the bank transfer his funds to another bank and, when the bank refused, Montesinos emailed Luis Alfredo Percovich, the officer assigned to the account, and threatened Percovich's life. Guevara then left for Miami to handle the money on Montesinos' behalf. When Percovich discovered that Guevara was on his way to Miami, he called the FBI who intercepted and arrested Guevara upon his arrival in the United States. The FBI offered to drop all charges against Guevara if he provided them with information on Montesinos' whereabouts. With Guevara's help, Montesinos was finally detained by Venezuelan authorities and expedited to Peru.

Peru refused to pay Guevara the reward that it promised in its emergency decree. Guevara sued Peru in the Southern District of Florida. The Court of Appeals was tasked with determining whether or not Peru had sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), the commercial activity exception to the FSIA, because in reaching its decision, the district court bypassed the question of whether, assuming that the offer of a reward constituted commercial activity, Peru established that it had immunity under subsection (a)(2).

While the Court admitted that the act of offering a reward was indeed commercial activity, it did not agree that that the court had subject matter jurisdiction. The opinion carefully takes apart subsection (a)(2) and shows that there is no definite link between the reward and commercial activity within or affecting the United States. Although a country may be sued over legitimate commercial activity, it does not mean that the U.S. courts have the jurisdiction to enforce a judgment against the sovereign. In this case, the country maintained its immunity despite being sued over commercial activities because those activities were not sufficiently linked to the United States. -- Laura P. Valle, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, D.C.

Service of process is a core requirement for the jurisdiction of American courts, which in federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia explore the options for service offered by the plaintiff in the matter Chaim Kaplan v. Hezbollah et al., docket number 09-646.

The plaintiff had attempted service by delivery through an international courier service at an address in Lebanon. In its June 7, 2010 ruling, the court held that attempt insufficient but allowed for service by publication under Rule 4(f)(3) which can even permit service by email.

The publication must appear in three Lebanese newspapers, the court ruled. Publication is not incompatible with the treaty obligations of the United States, it found. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On June 8, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled again against the owners of a pharmaceutical company that the United States destroyed after the Osama bin Laden bombing of two American embassies.

After an en-banc reconsideration, the court issued a detailed and wide-ranging decision in the matter El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. et al. v. United States, 07-5174. The 27-page opinion confirms the dismissal of the complaint which originally sought compensation and later only an acknowledgment that the factory was not an Obama bin Laden-sponsored facility.

Ultimately, the dismissal is based on the political question doctrine but the entire opinion is worth reading. The same is true for Circuit Judge Kavanaugh's 15-page concurrence and the 3-page concurrence from Circuit Judge Ginsburg. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

Based on an exception for international terrorism in 18 USC §2333, the estate of a security guard to diplomats traveling in Gaza killed by a bomb, sued the Palestinian Authority. On May 29, 2010, the United States District Court explains in great detail the requirements of the exception and the links connecting its elements. In the matter Estate of Mark Parsons, et al. v. The Palestinian Authority, et al., docket number 07-1847, the plaintiffs were unable to meet that burden under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On May 28th 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a summary order in Aurelius Capital Partners, LP et al., v. The Republic of Argentina, docket no. 09-2501-cv, which vacated an earlier order holding the Republic in civil contempt.

A previous order to provide discovery in regards to the location and movement of certain assets was unfulfilled due to the Republic of Argentina's alleged lack of control over the Administración Nacional de Seguridad Social who possessed this information. The district court then held the Republic in contempt.

However, since the underlying restraining order preventing the movements of assets had been vacated, the Court found, the validity of the contempt determination is now moot, id. at 4. -- Stephanie Petrew, legal assistant, Berliner, Corcoran amp; Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On May 19, 2010 in Leu and Leu v. The International Boundary Commission et al., docket number 07-35949, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court for the Western District of Washington's decision to deny the motions to strike all of the filings pertaining to defendant, Mr. Dennis Schornack on or after July 10, 2007.

The issue arose after Shirley-Ann and Herbert Leu brought a takings claim against the International Boundary Commission. The IBC is an international organization tasked with marking and maintaining the boundary between the United States and Canada. One of the defendants named in the case was Schornack who was one of two commissioners of the IBC at the time that the dispute occurred.

The filings in question are several documents that claim that Shornack was actually fired from the position of commissioner by the United States President. In 2002 the President had sent Shornack a letter dismissing him from the position and appointing David Berhardt, but Shornack vehemently disagreed that this action was within the President's power. Shornack claimed that 1) the treaties governing the establishment of the IBC did not give the President the power to fire him and 2) the department of justice has no business representing the IBC because it is an international organization.

The court cited a lack of jurisdiction under Article III of the United States constitution. The court also stated that because neither the President nor any high-ranking member of the executive branch is party to this suit the defendant's claim was not appropriate. The court went on to say that Schornack had elected to contest the lawfulness of the President's attempt to remove him by filing motion in a suit in which no executive-branch official is a party.

The court did not discuss Shornack's claim regarding the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice still represents the IBC in the district court. -- Laura P. Valle, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, D.C.

On May 4, 2010, Tom Taylor contrasted the issue of direct effects in the United States under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Turkish Bank's Role in Scam Did Not Cause Direct Effects in U.S., Second Circuit Holds, 78 US Law Weekly 41.

He examines the commercial activities exception to the FSIA in the context of a tort claim and a contract claim, one decided by the Second Circuit in Guierlando v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S., docket number 09-0478, and the other decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in Cruise Connections Charter Management, et al. v. The Attorney General of Canada, et al., docket number 09-7060.

Taylor notes the assistance of the colleagues of the Embassy Law publisher at Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, partner Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr. and counsel Laina C. Lopez. -- Laura P. Valle, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, D.C.

In an April 13, 2010 ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Court affirmed the lower court's order that a discovery be conducted on the issue of whether defendant PT. Bank Negara Idonesia, BNI, was subject to litigation due to the commercial activity exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, FSIA.

In the case Theodore Hansen et al. v. PT. Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) et al., docket no. 09-4052, the plaintiffs filed suit when the defendant refused to honor certain financial instruments they had issued on the premise that those instruments were fraudulent.

According to the court, the plaintiffs had compelling evidence that suggested these instruments were at the very least authenticated and the subsequently rejected by employees of the defendant-appellant. Thus, the lower court allowed for a limited jurisdictional discovery on whether [BNI], or its officials conducted commercial activity that satisfies the commercial activity exception under the [FSIA].

In this case the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to allow for limited jurisdictional discovery relying on Maxey ex rel. Maxey v. Fulton, 890 F.2d 279, 282-83 (10th Cir. 1989). The precedent states that in the qualified immunity context, discoveries that are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are not immediately appealable. Thus, the Court of Appeals would only have jurisdiction to rule in favor of BNI if the district court did not adequately limit permissible discovery to the question of BNI's immunity. -- Laura Valle, legal assistant,Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, D.C.

The ABA Journal lists as news the claim for diplomatic immunity by Mohammed al-Madadi, said to be a midlevel diplomat from Qatar, who reportedly will not face criminal charges for an alleged joke about lighting his shoes and a claim that he may have wanted to smoke in the rest room of an airplance on April 7, 2010 on a flight from Washington to Denver.

The embassy of Qatar released a statement from ambassador Ali Bin Fahad Al-Hajri on its website. He explains that the travel was for official embassy business and suggests mitakes rather than security issues. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

A United States court may exercize subject-matter jurisdiction over a foreign state under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act if the foreign government, or its agents and instrumentalities, cause a direct effect in the United States, 28 USC §1602(a)(2).

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia applied this rule to a situation involving the Royal Canadian Mounted Police which had entered into, and later allegedly broken, a contract with a U.S. corporation.

The effects allegedly felt by the corporation occurred in the United States and qualified under the FSIA, the court held on April 6, 2010 in the matter Cruise Connections Charter Management 1, LP et al. v. Attorney General of Canada et al., docket number 09-7060. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On March 29, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court for the Southern District of New York's dismissal of Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management Company's appeal that P.T. Jamsostek (Persero) negligently supervised its employee, Prio Adhi Sartono, along with other Jamsostek employees acting together in an international commercial reinsurance fraud scheme that allegedly damaged Anglo-Iberia, in Anglo-Iberia et al. v. Lodderhose et al, docket number 08-2666-cv. P.T. Jamsostek is an instrumentality of the Republic of Indonesia.

The appeal did not contest whether Jamsostek and Indonesia are indeed foreign sovereigns entitled to sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), rather, it concerned whether the commercial activity exception under FSIA applied to the facts.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Anglo-Iberia.s negligent supervision claim against Jamsostek and Indonesia was not, in fact, grounded upon an action connected to commercial activity. The Court of Appeals held that the district court was correct in its decision that

the nature of Jamsostek's hiring, supervision, and employment of Sartono and other employees is directly concerned with "employment in the provision of a governmental program of health benefits through collection of employer contributions and payroll deductions" and that such employment is by nature non-commercial.

Further, the Court of Appeals noted that even if it was assumed arguendo that they were indeed engaged in commercial activity, such alleged negligent supervision was not in association with commercial activity.

The Court of Appeals confirmed, therefore, the dismissal of the negligent supervision claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.-- Cassandra Sheehan, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, D.C.

On March 25, 2010 in Erfrat Ungar et al. v. The Palestine Liberation Organization el al., docket number No. 09-1778, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the District Court of Rhode Island's decision to deny relief to the PLO from a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). Originally, the court noted, the PLO had decided not to participate in discovery nor answer the initial complaint and, instead, instituted a strategy of stonewalling that led to failure and a default judgment against it on July 12, 2004.

However in 2007, a radical shift in the organization and leadership of the PLO occurred. Its new counsel implemented the PLO's revised policy on dealing with foreign litigation to one of cooperation where they would litigate this matter fully and responsibly, id. 4. The PLO petitioned the District Court of Rhode Island to vacate the 2004 judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) due to exceptional circumstances, namely, the political transformation and the sensitive U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, especially that surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

The District Court applied a categorial bar of relief under the view that the defendants engaged knowingly in their stonewalling strategy despite warnings of the consequences.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit remanded the District Court's decision to bar relief based on a categorial rule which in its view did not incorporate a full analysis of the totality of the circumstances, thus rewarding the PLO's change of heart. -- Stephanie Petrew, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

May a court in the United States judge acts of torture committed abroad by a foreign government official? The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act affords foreign governments and their officials immunity. Does the Torture Victim Protection Act strip it and grant the courts subject-matter jurisdiction?

The issue is now before the Supreme Court of the United States in Washington, DC. It heard arguments on March 3, 2010 in the matter Samantar v. Yousuf, docket number 08-1555. The ABA posted the briefs. The Washington Post published a report on the hearing and an editorial of March 6, 2010. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

The United Nations' absolute immunity under United States law was reaffirmed in an opinion decided on March 2, 2010. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling to dismiss the case Brzak et al. v. United Nations et al., docket no. 08-2799.

The original complaint cited an incident in 2003 wherein Cynthia Brzak claimed she was improperly touched by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees during the course of a staff meeting in Geneva. Brzak, acting upon the advice of her co-plaintiff Nasr Ishak, filed a complaint with the United Nations' Office of Internal Oversight Services, OIOS. The offending High Commissioner was eventually exonerated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Thereafter, both Brzak and Ishak claim that their superiors retaliated against them.

Brzak and Ishak sued the UN and the individuals involved in the incident in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The case was dismissed on the grounds that the UN has absolute immunity under United States law.

The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the United Nations had absolute immunity. The plaintiffs-appellants had argued that the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, CPIUN, the treaty that gives the UN absolute immunity, was not self-executing; therefore, since there had not been legislation pertaining to the treaty after its ratification, the US did not need to recognize UN immunity in domestic litigation. Furthermore, they argued that even if the CPIUN had been self-executing because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, FSIA, was passed after its ratification. FSIA, they argued, strips foreign sovereigns of their immunity in certain circumstances.

First, the court of appeals stated that whatever immunities are possessed by other international organizations, the CPIUN unequivocally grants the United Nations absolute immunity without exception. Second, they noted that the appellants had made no claims that the UN had violated any exceptions to the immunity under FSIA.

The court of appeals finished by stating: legislatively and judicially crafted immunities of one sort or another have existed since well before the framing of the Constitution, have been extended and modified over time, and are firmly embedded in American law. -- Laura P. Valle, Legal Assistant Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, D.C.

The Death Penalty blog recites case facts from The Times in a death penalty notification matter that has been filed with a British government brief with the United States Supreme Court in Washington, DC.

Again, Texas is said to have disregarded its consular notification obligations. The February 27, 2010 article, Death-row inmate Linda Carty launches last-chance appeal to US Supreme Court, leaves unclear whether the facts have been researched by the author or have been taken from the Times.

The Texas death row inmate is stated to be Linda Carty. The notification principle had been confirmed by treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, almost 50 years ago and by the International Court of Justice. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

On the periphery of the never-ending saga of the Ambassador Letelier assassination in 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the appointment of a guardian for the defendant in the case Gonzalez-Vera, et. al. v. Townley, et. al., docket no. 09-5134.

The appellee in this case, Michael Vernon Townley pled guilty to conspiracy to murder a foreign official in connection with the 1976 assassination of former Chilean ambassador and foreign minister Orlando Letelier. After spending five years in prison, he entered into the Witness Security Program, WSP. In the years following his incarceration and during his subsequent time in the WSP, Townley was linked to the July 1976 brutal murder of Carmelo Soria Espinoza, a United Nations diplomat.

Soria's widow, Laura Gonzalez-Vera sued Townley for damages. Townley defaulted on the suit and the district court entered a $7 million judgment against him. Gonzalez-Vera asked the Attorney General to help collect the judgment. The WSP director to whom the Attorney General had delegated the task concluded that it was "not unreasonable for [Townley] to pay $75 per week" toward the judgment. Gonzalez-Vera rejected this offer and sued Townley in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court then dismissed the case, stating that Gonzalez-Vera lack[ed] statutory authorization to bring this suit. The district court recited 18 U.S.C. §§ 3523(a), 3523(b)(1), and 3523(b)(3) as follows:

3523(a): If judgment is entered against an individual in WSP and that individual has not made reasonable efforts to comply with the judgment, their location may be disclosed to the plaintiff.
3523(b)(1): Upon a decision by the Attorney General to deny disclosure of the defendant's identity and location, a petitioner can bring an action into district court to collect on the judgment.
3523(b)(3): If the petitioner a) holds a judgment entered by a Federal or State court and b) if the Attorney General has declined to disclose the current identity and location to the petitioner, a guardian may be appointed.

Gonzalez-Vera argued in the district court that sections 3523(a) and 3523(b) are two independent mechanisms to assist with enforcement of an outstanding judgment. The court disagreed and Gonzalez-Vera appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the basis that the district court had misinterpreted the statutes.

On February 23, 2010, the Circuit Court agreed with the district court, stating that the language in the statute's segments meant for one to follow the other. They added that if the court agreed with Gonzalez-Vera's interpretation, every case in which the protected person's identity are not disclosed would allow for a guardian, including cases where the protected person has made reasonable efforts to satisfy the judgment. They stated that, given the statute's language and structure, and the risks of disclosing a protected person's identity and location even to a court-appointed guardian, we think it clear that Congress intended to make guardianship available only where the Attorney General find that the protected person is failing to make reasonable efforts to satisfy the judgment. -- Laura Valle, Legal Assistant, Berliner, Corcoran, & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.

An ambassador party to a lawsuit initiated by his nation and his embassy may not be deposed without a waiver of sovereign immunity, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia decided in Great Socialist People's Libyan Ara Jamahiriy et al. v. Ahmad Miski, docket number 06-2046, on January 25, 2010.

The defendant had responded to the complaint with a counterclaim and sought the ambassador's deposition. The court also ruled that Libya cannot rely on its sovereign immunity to defeat the counterclaim.

The memorandum and opinion is instructive and detailed. The case involves trademark and domain name law under the Lanham Act, 15 USC §1125(a)(1)(A) and (B) (2006), and the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 USC §1125(d) (2006), as well as counterclaimed compensation under tort law. -- Clemens Kochinke, partner, Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP, Washington, DC.